Labour and Language.
Paolo Virno
'In the
period of manufacture, and during the long apogee of Fordist labour, labour activity is mute.
Who
labours keeps quiet.
Production is a silent chain, where only a mechanical and exterior relation
between what precedes it and
what follows it is allowed, whilst any interactive correlation between what is
simultaneous to it is expunged. Living labour, an appendix of the system of
machines, follows a natural causality in order to use its power: what Hegel
called 'cunning' of labouring. And 'cunning' is known to be taciturn. In the
postfordist metropolis, on the other hand, the material labouring process can
be empirically described as a complex of linguistic acts, a sequence of
assertions, a symbolic interaction. This is partly due to the fact that now
labour activity is performed aside the system of machines, with
regulating, surveillance and coordinating duties; but also because the
productive process uses knowledge, information, culture and social relations as
its ‘primary matter’.
The
labourer is (and must be) loquacious. The famous opposition established
by Habermas between ‘instrumental’ and ‘communicative’ action (or between
labour and interaction) is radically confuted by the postfordist mode of
production. ‘Communicative action’ does not hold any privileged, or even
exclusive place in ethico-cultural relations, in politics, in the struggle for
‘mutual recognition’, whilst residing beyond the realm of material reproduction
of life. On the contrary, the dialogic word is installed at the very heart of
capitalist production. Labour is interaction. Therefore, in order to really understand postfordist
labouring praxis, one must increasingly refer to Saussure, to Wittgenstein and
to Carnap. These authors have hardly shown any interest in social relations of
production; nonetheless, having elaborated theories and images of language,
they have more to teach in relation to the ‘talkative factory’ than
professional sociologists.
When
labour performs surveillance and coordinating tasks, its duties no longer
consist in the accomplishment of a single particular aim, but rather in the
modulation (as well as variation and intensification) of social cooperation,
i.e. of the totality of systemic relations and connections that constitute the
now authentic ‘sustaining pole of production and wealth’ (Marx). Such a
modulation occurs through linguistic performances that, far from creating an
independent product, are exhausted in the communicative interaction determined
by their execution. Shortly:
a)
labour based on communication does not have a rigidly finalistic structure,
i.e. it is not guided by a predefined and univocal objective; b) in many cases,
such labour does not produce an extrinsic and long-lasting object, due to its
being an activity without Work (opera). Let us look at these aspects
more closely.
The
traditional concept of production is one and the same as that of finalism: the
producer is someone who pursues a determined aim. However, the strength of the
production-finalism is dependent on the restricted character of labour:
more precisely, on the rigorous exclusion of communication from the productive
process. The more we are dealing with merely instrumental action, for which the
fabric of dialogical intersubjective relations is inessential, the more
finalism appears to be prominent and unequivocal. Vice versa, the moment
communication becomes its constitutive element; it also damages the rigidly
finalistic connotation of labour.
Firstly,
let us consider the system of machines that characterise
postfordism. Unlike the fordist automated machine, the electronic machine is
incomplete and partially undetermined: rather than being the technological
imitation of given natural forces, to be bended for a specific purpose, it is
the premise for an indefinite cluster of operative possibilities. This cluster
of possibilities requires to be articulated by a number of linguistic acts
performanced by living labour. Communicative actions that elaborate the chances
endemic to the electronic machine are not oriented towards an aim that is
external to communication itself: they do not introduce a precedent in view of
a consequence, but have in themselves their own outcome. Enunciation is simultaneously means
and end, instrument and final product. In a linguistic context, the rules of
the project and those of its execution are one and the same. Such identity
abrogates the distinction between the two moments: intention and
realisation
coincide.
Let us
come to the second aspect. Besides contradicting the model of finalistic
action, communicative labour often fails to give raise to autonomous work that
will survive the labouring performance. Hence, the activities whose ‘product is
inseparable from the act of producing’ (Marx)- i.e. activities that are not
objectified in a lasting product- have a mercurial and ambiguous status that is
difficult to grasp. The reason of this difficulty is obvious. Long before being
incorporated in capitalist production, the activity without Work
(communicative action) was the architrave of politics. Hanna Arendt
writes: ‘the arts that do not produce any ‘Work’ share certain features with
politics. The artists who perform them –dancers, actors, musicians etc- need a
public to show their virtuousisms, just as those who act politically need
others to appeal to’. When communicative actions rather than new objects are
constructed, we enter the realm of politics. Postfordist labour, as linguistic
labour, requires attitudes and characteristics that used to be those of
political praxis: presentations in the presence of others, management of a
certain margin of unpredictability, capacity to begin something new, ability to
navigate amongst alternative possibilities.
When we
speak of language put to work, the main issue is not the massive increase of
communication industries, but the fact that communicative action predominates
in all industrial sectors. Therefore, one needs to look at the techniques and
procedures of the mass media as a model of universal value, independently of whether
we are considering the work on cars or steel.
It is
worth asking what the relation between the peculiar characters of the culture
industry and postfordism in general is. As we know, since Adorno and
Horkheimer, the ‘factories of soul’ (publishing, cinema, television, radio etc)
have been scrutinised under
the microscope of criticism, in the hope of finding out what made them
comparable to the productive chain. The crucial point was to demonstrate that
capitalism was able to mechanise
and
parcellise spiritual
production, just as it had mechanised and parcellised agriculture and
manufacture. Seriality, indifference to the singular task, econometrics of
emotions and feelings: these were the habitual refrains. Of course, it was
conceded that some aspects of what could be defined ‘production of
communication by means of communication’ seemed refractory to a complete
assimilation to the fordist organisation of the labouring process: but,
rightly, these were regarded as non influential, residual, modest nuisances,
minute scoria. However, looking at things with the eyes of the present, it is
not difficult to recognise that such ‘residues’ and such ‘scoria’ were in fact
pregnant with future: not echoes of a preceding period, but real predictions.
In brief: the informality of communicative action, the competitive interaction
that is typical of an editorial board meeting, the unpredictable twist that can
animate a television program, and generally, all that would be inconvenient to
regulate and rigidify beyond a certain level within the culture industry, has
now become the central and propelling nucleus of all social production under
postfordism. In this sense, one could ask whether ‘toyotism’ consists, at least
in part, in the application of operative models that were once only
applied to the culture industry to factories that produce lasting commodities.
The
communication industry (or ‘culture’ industry) has an analogous role to that
traditionally occupied by the industry of the means of production: it is
a particular productive sector that determines the operative instruments and
procedures which will then be largely applied to each corner of the social
labouring process.
The
putting to work (and to profit) of language is the material ground, hidden and
distorted, on which postmodern ideology rests. Examining the contemporary
metropolis, postmodern ideology underlines the unlimited and virtual
proliferation of ‘linguistic games’, the insurgence of provisional dialects, the multiplication of dissimilar voices. If we limit ourselves to fix
our eyes on this exuberant plurality, it is easy to conclude that it eludes any
analytical approach. In fact, the postmodern vernacular sustains that we are
faced with a net without mesh: the forms of metropolitan life –often brought about rather than reflected by the new idioms- could only be defined by
saying a rosary of ‘no longer’ and ‘not even’. A nice paradox: precisely due to
its eminently linguistic nature, the metropolis seems now indescribable.
Hypnotized by the generalised noise, postmodern
ideologues proclaim a drastic dematerialisation of
social relations, as well as an enfeeblement of domination. In their view, the
only ethico-political dimension oscillates between the acceptance and the
refusal of the multiplicity of idioms. The sole unforgivable sin is the wish to
limit the diasporas of ‘linguistic games’. Apart from this, everything
is fine. The plurality of idioms would entail in itself an
emancipatory effect, by melting away the illusion of a univocal and restrictive
reality. The hermeneutics that has become common sense suggests that that
which, as we go along, results from the crossing of different interpretations
is properly ‘real’. However, the ironic infatuation for the plurality of
discourses reascribes to language
all the myths that liberalism once nurtured about the market. Centrifugal
communication, fed by infinite independent speakers, is dealt with the same
deferential arguments once given in favour of the free circulation of
commodities: Eden of rights, kingdom of equality and mutual recognition. But
does multiplicity as such really weaken control? Is it not rather the case that
the latter is powerfully articulated in each of the ‘many’? None of the
stockbrokers is now aware of the hermeneutic character of truth or the
ephemeral character of each interpretation: is this sufficient to revoke any
objection to their form of life?
A distinctive feature of the contemporary
metropolis is the full identity of material production and linguistic
communication, rather than the swarming of idioms. This identity explains and
increases that multiplication. But this identity has nothing emancipatory.
Contrary to what the postmodern jingle suggests,
the coinciding of labour and linguistic communication radicalises the antinomies
of the dominant mode of production, rather than weakening them. On the one
hand, labouring activity is less measurable on the basis of abstract temporal
units, since it includes aspects that up until yesterday belonged to the sphere
of the ethos, of cultural
consumption, of aesthetic taste, of emotion. On the other hand, labour time
remains the socially accepted unit of measure. Hence, the multiple ‘linguistic
games’, even the most eccentric, are always about to be configured as new
‘tasks’, or as desirable requirements for the old ones. When wage labour gets
abolished because it constitutes an excessive social cost, then even taking the
word is included in its horizon. Language presents itself at once as the
terrain of conflict and as what is at stake, to the extent that freedom
of speech, with a less parodic meaning than the liberal one,
and abolition of wage labour are
today synonyms. The critical stand must possess this radicalism; otherwise it
merely amounts to resentful grumbling. In a way, we cannot question wage labour without introducing a powerful idea of freedom of
speech; whilst we cannot seriously invoke freedom of speech without aiming to
suppress wage labour.
Translated by Arianna Bove